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I. INTRODUCTION
The race is on for businesses and consumers to join the cloud. From increased efficiency to low operational costs to scalability, reasons abound for why we are adopting cloud solutions. Beyond the buzzwords, what is the cloud? There is no single agreed-upon definition of cloud computing. In essence, this term refers to the delivery of computing resources (for example, storage) as a service through a network (such as the Internet) on a scalable, pay-by-use (if not free) and on-demand basis. 1 Industry research has highlighted that regulatory and legal issues, such as data protection and privacy issues, can prevent the widespread adoption of cloud-based systems.
2 For example, a cloud solution can involve a complex chain of Cloud Providers. 3 In data protection terms, this may lead to several problems, including difficulties in determining which Cloud Providers are acting as data "controllers" or data "processors." 4 The data "controller"/"processor" categorization is crucial under the current European data protection laws to determine and allocate data protection responsibilities.
Lately, European data protection authorities (EU DPAs) have investigated many U.S.-based cloud companies ("Cloud Investigations"). 5 That European regulators have so far investigated mostly U.S.-based cloud companies is perhaps not surprising, given that such companies have a sizeable market share of the European cloud market. 6 EU DPAs are the statutory independent public regulatory bodies that have many functions, including enforcing data protection laws in the European Economic Area (EEA). 7 Investigations refer to the power of EU DPAs to investigate data "controllers," such as companies providing cloud-based services ("Cloud Providers"), in specific circumstances, including when an individual complains. 8 The increase in Cloud Investigations raises interesting questions about how "personal data" are regulated by the regulatory tool of investigation and the roles of data protection laws during Cloud Investigations. "Personal data" means "any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person." 9 Current data protection literature adopts a state-centric approach to data protection laws. 10 From this viewpoint, data protection laws are viewed as static regulatory tools that are deployed in only one direction (for example, from the EU DPA to the Cloud Provider) to achieve the aims of the state through its legislative draftspersons and enforcers. 11 As an illustration, many scholars approach data protection laws solely as binding rules-imposed by 6. Other factors, such as media reports of data breaches by U.S.-based Cloud Providers and complaints filed by EU-resident users, can also account for why U.S.-based Cloud Providers have been investigated. See Interview 1, infra note 140. The interviews on which this Article is based are set forth in notes 140-42, infra.
7. Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 28. In different jurisdictions, several labels are used to denote the statutory independent public regulatory body that has the function of applying and enforcing data protection laws. For example, in the UK the DPA is referred to as the "Information Commissioner" whereas in Italy the DPA is referred to as "Il Garante per la protezione dei dati personali." Some legislative frameworks, such as the Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, use the term "supervisory authorities" to refer to such bodies. the state from a top-down direction-that create new legal obligations, powers, and actors, such as EU DPAs. 12 Such scholars tend to analyze data protection laws from a mostly textual perspective. 13 For instance, some writers focus on analyzing the inconsistent implementation of the Data Protection Directive. 14 The Data Protection Directive regulates the processing of personal data in EEA countries. 15 Data protection laws often seem to have a privileged role in regulating "personal data" in such writings because they are approached as the sole or principal objects of analysis. 16 More recent works on data protection laws concede that social interactions, such as discussions among regulators, can also have an impact on how data protection laws are applied in practice. 17 However, such works still approach investigations as tools that are deployed in one direction, namely from the regulator to the regulatee, to achieve only the aims of the state as envisaged by the lawmakers and law enforcers. 18 In this Article, I analyze selected empirical findings from my recent qualitative socio-legal research project 19 where I have examined EU DPAs' investigations of Cloud Providers to reflect on the roles of data protection laws during Cloud Investigations. I understand data protection laws as encompassing the relevant European directives and regulation, national data protection and related procedural laws, rulings from the national and European courts, and the guidance or the opinions from EU DPAs and the Article 29 Working Party (A29WP). 20 Consequently, my understanding of law also encompasses "soft" laws, including the non-binding A29WP opinions.
I advance two arguments. First, a decentralized perspective on Cloud Investigations sheds a more comprehensive light on the roles of data protection laws during those investigations without assuming a priori that such laws have a privileged and static role in the regulatory process. Second, I argue that by "cutting off the King's head," we can understand more fully the dynamic and context-dependent roles of data protection laws during Cloud Investigations. From time to time, law can be deployed to achieve the aims of the lawmakers I pursue these arguments in the remaining six Parts. Part II of this Article begins by providing a brief introduction to cloud computing and the data protection issues that can be raised by such technologies. Part III goes on to critically evaluate some of the main provisions of the European data protection laws that apply to Cloud Investigations. Part IV conceptualizes law in broader terms than a mere norm issued by the sovereign state, which is backed by sanctions and enforced by specific actors. Part V explains the methodology of this Article. In Part VI, I analyze selected empirical findings to evaluate how EU DPAs and Cloud Providers can often strategically use data protection laws in ways that have not been anticipated by the legislative draftsperson or enforcer, namely as bargaining tools. Finally, in Part VII, I consider how multiple "centers of calculation" (for example, technological, social, and legal) rather than merely legal "centers of calculation" are involved during Cloud Investigations to highlight that data protection laws do not have a privileged and static role during Cloud Investigations.
II. A PRIMER ON CLOUD COMPUTING
The rapid pace of innovation in the information and communications technology sector means that we often encounter a new term like "cloud computing" that encapsulates an emerging innovation with a number of technical and commercial characteristics. In this Part, I introduce the reader to cloud computing by paying attention to its service and deployment models. I also underline how the data protection concerns raised by cloud ecosystems are very much tied to how such ecosystems are configured in terms of their service and deployment layers.
For many, cloud computing signals a new phase in computing as it enables its users to access computing resources, such as storage and processing, stored on shared and remote systems, on-demand, irrespective of location, on an agile basis with metered pricing (if any) through a network.
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Through its characteristics, including pooling, scalability, and on-demand, cloud computing enables its users to reduce their capital expenditure (such as the costs of purchasing hardware) and incur only operational costs. 23 As an example, the website of a fashion store can often receive a high level of traffic at variable times, such as during the bank holiday sales. Consequently, the store needs the flexibility to double or triple how much traffic its website can handle during these peak times. If the store hosts its website on a cloud server, such as Storm on Demand, with a few clicks the store can instantaneously provision its server so that its website can handle the increased traffic level and scale it back down again after the traffic levels return to normal. 24 The fashion store is billed on a metered basis, which means that it pays for only the utilized resources. 25 This can be a far more cost-effective solution for the store than using a dedicated hosting solution, which would require the store to invest in, configure, and maintain a more powerful machine as well as retain the machine even when traffic levels have decreased.
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Cloud services can be characterized by their service and deployment models. In terms of service models, cloud-based solutions can involve one or more service models, typically Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service (SaaS). 27 Put simply, an IaaS cloud (for example, Amazon's Elastic Compute Cloud) offers access to raw computing resources, such as computing hardware. 28 A PaaS cloud, such as Google App Engine, offers access to a computing platform that enables its customers to develop and run software applications. 29 An SaaS cloud (Dropbox is an example of an SaaS cloud) offers its users access to a complete software application through a network. 30 Cloud solutions can often involve different layers of cloud services, which results in a complex supply chain that may not always be apparent to the end user. 31 As an illustration, a company can offer a calendar software to its clients as an SaaS. However, the company hosts the software on an IaaS cloud that is owned and operated by another company. In this example, it is often difficult for the end users to know which providers or sub-providers, other than the SaaS provider, are involved in delivering this service and the data protection responsibilities of such subproviders and providers.
Cloud-based solutions can be delivered in various ways. Typically, there are four main deployment models: private cloud, community cloud, public cloud, and hybrid cloud. 32 In plain terms, a private cloud provides computing resources as a service within a virtualized environment using an underlying 24 pool of computing resources. 33 The client benefits from the advantages of cloud computing, such as self-service and agility, while having greater control over the cloud environment because the client is the only entity that can access the pool of resources. 34 Community clouds refer to cloud environments that are shared among limited groups of users with common requirements, such as security and privacy. 35 Public clouds refer to cloud environments that are shared among multiple users who utilize the same computing resources, such as servers and storage. 36 Finally, hybrid clouds involve a mix of private, community, and public clouds. 37 One of the main differences between these four deployment models is that they provide their users with varying levels of control over data, which can lead to data protection issues. For example, there are concerns about unauthorized data access in multi-tenant public cloud environments. 38 In some cases, unauthorized data access can be addressed by various measures, including devising robust access policies and partitioning the data of tenants. 39 However, in other cases, such as when sensitive personal data (for example, financial data) are processed in a public cloud, such measures may still be insufficient to ensure regulatory compliance. 40 
III. CLOUD INVESTIGATIONS AND DATA PROTECTION LAWS: A CRITICAL EVALUATION
Having explained some of the main characteristics of cloud computing and that the data protection concerns raised by cloud ecosystems are tied to these characteristics, in this Part, I critically analyze some of the main provisions of the Data Protection Directive that apply to Cloud Investigations. The Data Protection Directive provides the point of departure for most of the analysis, because EU DPAs apply the directive as nationally implemented.
41
Where relevant, I also discuss the national implementing laws.
The Data Protection Directive has several aims, including harmonizing European data protection laws, protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals, and promoting the trans-border flow of personal data. 42 44 EEA countries have a large degree of discretion when they implement the Data Protection Directive nationally because many provisions of the Directive-including Article 28, the main provision setting out the investigatory powers of EU DPAs-are very broad and vague. 45 Depending on the aims and foci of the investigations, other provisions of the Data Protection Directive may also be relevant.
My empirical analysis has highlighted that, at a baseline, most Cloud Investigations aim to assess the legal compliance of Cloud Providers and enforce data protection laws in cases of non-compliance. 46 However, depending on the context, some Cloud Investigations can also have other aims, including encouraging the Cloud Provider to adopt "best practice" recommendations that go beyond the letter of the law and educating the Cloud Provider about its data protection obligations. 47 52 To what extent might the Cloud Provider be able to influence the technical testing stage of the Cloud Investigation when it fully or partially bears the costs of hiring an independent technical expert? EU DPAs can put in place safeguards, including contractual clauses, providing that the expert will act only under the strict instructions of the regulator. 53 However, even in such cases, it is possible that such financial arrangements may affect the outcomes of the investigation. 54 Second, although Article 28 of the Data Protection Directive endows EU DPAs with many powers, including investigative and intervention powers, the inconsistent implementation of the directive means that many EU DPAs are still not endowed with full powers. 55 As an example, the Hellenic DPA does not have the power to bring a case directly before the judicial authorities. 56 This may have an impact on the range of actions available to EU DPAs if a Cloud Provider refuses to implement some of its recommendations after a Cloud Investigation. 57 Even in cases in which EU DPAs have similar powers, such as the powers to impose a monetary penalty, there can still be national differences. 58 EU DPAs can often have different maximum fine levels. 59 In practice, this means that there can often be inconsistent sanctions applied by EU DPAs after Cloud Investigations. When EU DPAs impose varying sanctions when investigating the same Cloud Provider for substantially similar breaches, this can have an impact on the effectiveness of the law's sanctioning powers. 60 Recently, some EU DPAs have imposed different levels of fines following their investigations into the compliance of the privacy policy of authorities and their effectiveness in protecting fundamental rights in data protection).
52 Google Inc. ("Google") with the applicable data protection laws. 61 For example, the French DPA levied a maximum fine of €150,000 against Google and also required the company to display its order on the company's website for forty-eight hours. 62 The Spanish DPA fined Google €900,000, while the Dutch DPA will impose an incremental penalty payment amounting to €15 million if Google fails to implement specific changes by a set deadline. 63 On the other side of the English Channel, the UK DPA recently opted not to fine Google and successfully negotiated an undertaking that requires Google to implement specific changes to its privacy policy within a prescribed time frame. 64 Many stakeholders have criticized the divergent approaches of the EU DPAs in the Google investigations. 65 Third, Article 28(3) of the Data Protection Directive specifies some of the investigative powers of an EU DPA: "powers of access to data forming the subject-matter of processing operations and powers to collect all the information necessary for the performance of its supervisory duties." 66 As this provision does not provide an exhaustive list of the investigative tasks of EU DPAs, these tasks have been inconsistently fleshed out either in national implementing laws or through the practices of EU DPAs. 67 As an illustration, EU DPAs, such as the French DPA, have the power to undertake online inspections, while others do not. 68 It also means that non-legal factors, such as financial or external pressures faced by EU DPAs, can often have an impact on the tasks deployed during an investigation. 69 For instance, some of the smaller EU DPAs with limited financial resources tend to favor investigative practices that are not as draining on their resources. Contract and code review are examples of these types of tasks. 70 This divergence can often have an impact on the outcomes of investigations generally. In the cloud context, depending on the Cloud Investigation in question, EU DPAs that carry broader and more detailed investigative tasks (such as code testing rather than code review) are more likely to generate a fuller evaluation of the Cloud Provider's legal compliance than the regulators who do not conduct such detailed compliance assessments. 71 Fourth, the wide ambit of Article 28 also means that certain aspects of Cloud Investigations, such as what the Cloud Provider can expect before, during, and after a Cloud Investigation, are inconsistently fleshed out at a national level. 72 Consequently, investigated Cloud Providers can often encounter varying degrees of openness, transparency, and consistency in different jurisdictions. 73 It is evident that European laws have to be transposed in such a way that they are compatible with the legal system of each EEA country. 74 However, the inconsistent guidance that EU DPAs provide to Cloud Providers on Cloud Investigations causes significant problems for such companies. 75 Such organizations have more or less information about the process in question depending on the territory in question. 76 Relatedly, many companies rely on the non-binding advice provided by EU DPAs to assess their data compliance before the start of the Cloud Investigations.
78 However, such advice can often be inconsistent with one another. As an example, the Irish DPA advises data "controllers" operating in a single tenant cloud arrangement to discharge their security obligations by directly auditing the security measures put in place by the company that provides them with their cloud-based service. 79 It is questionable to what extent it is practical and feasible for data "controllers" to directly inspect the premises of such organizations. Conversely, the UK DPA advises data "controllers" to discharge their security obligations by requiring an independent third party to conduct a detailed security audit of the cloud services they use as well as provide a copy of this assessment to their prospective customers. 80 The inconsistent advice that Cloud Providers can often receive from EU DPAs about data protection in the cloud can be partly explained by the fact that EU DPAs operate at a national rather than transnational level when producing such guidance. 81 In practice, such inconsistent guidance means that the data "controllers" operating in various EEA countries may often have to rely on disparate national guidance when determining their data protection compliance before or during a Cloud Investigation. 82 Additionally, many of my EU DPA respondents have argued that national guidance on cloud computing plays an important role during Cloud Investigations. 83 For instance, this information guides the investigative staff of the EU DPA by reminding the team of cloudcentric matters, such as the importance of avoiding a "one size fits all" 84 approach. 85 Thus, it is crucial for such guidance to share a common baseline that reflects a European perspective on the regulation of cloud data. This is particularly important given that some Cloud Investigations can often involve formal or informal cooperation between EU DPAs. 86 Finally, one of my key empirical findings was that so far many Cloud Investigations seem to tackle general data protection issues rather than cloudspecific ones. 87 When I raised this issue with my EU DPA respondents, they all unanimously stated that they did not view an investigation of a cloud-based (Aug. 2014), https://www.dataprotection.ie/docimages/documents/GuidetoAuditProcessAug2014.pdf (setting out the guidance for investigations that the Irish DPA undertakes of its own volition pursuant to the Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2003, infra note 133, § 10(1A)).
78. reasons, including security. 98 The rest of this Part critically evaluates the decisions of the Dutch DPA on WhatsApp's data retention and encryption practices to highlight their weaknesses in the cloud context.
When considering some of WhatsApp's data retention practices (for example, the retention period of the personal data of inactive users or nonWhatsApp users) the Dutch DPA did not consider how WhatsApp handles the data after the expiry of the retention period. 99 In other words, the Dutch DPA did not examine WhatsApp's data deletion practices. 100 This is surprising given the close connection between data retention and data deletion in the Data Protection Directive. 101 
Initially, the Dutch DPA determined that WhatsApp was in breach of the Dutch data protection laws because WhatsApp transmitted user messages in an unencrypted form. 102 However, at the later stages of the WhatsApp Investigation, the Dutch DPA was satisfied that WhatsApp did not breach the law on this point since by then WhatsApp had implemented end-to-end encryption for its user messages. 103 From the investigation report, it is unclear whether the Dutch DPA fully tested the end-to-end encryption implemented by WhatsApp. 104 Four interconnected concepts inform my view on Cloud Investigations and law, namely, power, "governmentality," "centers of calculation," and "action at a distance." 109 In brief, Foucault argues that power does not emanate from only one single source or one single direction (for example, the state or top-down). 110 Rather, power emanates from multiple sources and directions (that is, also bottom-up). 111 "Governmentality" is apposite here as it facilitates our understanding of how the relationships between multiple actors are strategically organized. 116 "Governmentality" refers to the "conduct of conduct" 117 or in "the broad sense . . . [to] techniques and procedures for directing human behavior . . .
[g]overnment of children . . . of souls and consciences . . . of a household, of a state, or of oneself" to achieve definite and shifting ends and with often unpredictable outcomes, effects, or consequences. 118 "Governmentality" enables us to analyze the attempts of multiple authorities and agencies to shape the conduct of actors through complex webs of knowledge, techniques, and tactics to achieve "economy" for the population, which becomes crucial in defining the aims of government. 119 Government refers to "an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them." 120 By thinking of a Cloud Investigation in terms of "governmentality," I analyze it as a means of ordering relations between relevant actors in order to achieve specific ends, such as protecting personal data rights.
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"Governmentality" highlights the mundane, intricate, and diversified practices, routines, skills, and bodies of knowledge that interconnect to render the field of governance amenable to intervention by multiple actors during Cloud Investigations.
122 It also underscores the new forms of inquiry, such as code testing, that shed light on the data protection compliance of the investigated companies in order to achieve particular aims, for example, protecting personal data rights.
The "governmentality" perspective also draws our attention to how "inscriptions," such as the annotations made by the Cloud Providers when filling out the questionnaires of the EU DPAs, enable power to be exercised 115 over actors that may be distant from one another.
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"Inscriptions"-or material and graphical representations of a thing in a durable or mobile form, such as a tabular representation of the storage options of the cloud servicebecome key here as they provide significant information to actors such as the EU DPA's legal and technical staff so that they can later "act upon" or attempt to order elements that are spatially and organizationally distant from them. 124 Data centers located in various jurisdictions are examples of such elements. Numerous "inscriptions" generated from different locales-such as the "inscriptions" made by the software engineer when designing a specific technology and the "inscriptions" made by the legal advisers when amending or drafting a specific contract, for example a Privacy Notice-are aggregated, compared, compiled, and analyzed by the EU DPA during the Cloud Investigation. 125 These heterogeneous "inscriptions" are brought together in one local "center of calculation," such as the office of the commissioner of an EU DPA, to enable this local center to act upon the entity in question.
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Power here is very much an "achievement," which depends in part on constantly harnessing multiple sources of information about the data processing practices and operations of the Cloud Provider. 127 "Governmentality" is particularly useful when studying Cloud Investigations because this perspective enables me to avoid two key problems found in the data protection literature on the powers of EU DPAs. First, the "governmentality" perspective prevents me from limiting my analysis to the actions of the state and its agents only. Second, the "governmentality" perspective enables me to conceive of law in broader terms than the current data protection law literature does. Consequently, I do not approach law only as a binding set of rules that are complied with, breached, or enforced. This vantage point, often used in the data protection literature, focuses only on the determinate side of law in the sense of definite norms to be complied with. 128 Importantly, the "governmentality" perspective sheds light on law's responsiveness when it is applied in a specific context. 129 Just like other laws, data protection laws do not operate in a vacuum but constantly engage with other sources of power, resistance, and so on when they are applied in practice. 130 Consequently, applying data protection laws is an "import-export on multiple data sources to support a conclusion. All of my interviews were conducted on a non-attributable basis over the telephone or by Skype, depending on the respondent's availability. Consequently, I am unable to provide any information that identifies my respondents, including a list of the interviewed organizations. Most interviews lasted one hour, were audiotaped when the respondent consented, and were fully transcribed. When transcribing the interviews, I ensured that the transcriptions were as close to the interviews as possible by, for example, minimally tidying up the text. I explored various themes during the interviews, including the relationships between the actors during Cloud Investigations and the factors that affect Cloud Investigations (for example, the attitudes of Cloud Providers). I adopted flexible and non-leading interviewing techniques to ensure that the respondents could tell their own stories of Cloud Investigations. I used multiple strategies to manage difficult interviews. For example, when I had to ask commercially or legally sensitive questions, such as when I queried the links between the Snowden revelations and Cloud Investigations, I phrased these questions carefully so that the respondents did not clam up. 149 I used the following techniques to ensure that my data analysis was rigorous:
 Explanation building;  Generating explanatory descriptive themes and sub-themes;  Evaluating how the themes and sub-themes relate to one another;  Using theoretical notions (such as "action at distance") to generate more abstract themes; and  Searching for empirical data that challenged my theoretical and empirical assumptions to ensure that my data analysis was valid. Having explained my methodology, in the next Part, I examine some of my empirical findings on how data protection laws are used during Cloud Investigations.
2014) (granting ethical approval) (on file with author).
146. Cloud Provider Interviews, supra note 141. 147. EU DPA Interviews, supra note 140. 148. European Institution Interviews, supra note 142. 149. Edward Snowden is a former contractor of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Edward Snowden: Leaks that Exposed US Spy Programme, BBC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-us-canada-23123964. In June 2013, Mr. Snowden leaked the details of extensive Internet and phone surveillance by the NSA. Id. These leaks were followed by further revelations in several newspapers that the NSA directly tapped into the servers of various Internet companies, including multinational Cloud Providers, such as Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo!, to track online communications. Id.
VI. STRATEGIC USE OF DATA PROTECTION LAWS: BARGAINING ENFORCEMENT
In this Part, I analyze how data protection laws can often be strategically deployed during Cloud Investigations by the regulator and regulatee to advance or stall negotiations. Even in cases where the strategic use of laws achieves the aims of the legislators, for example, compliance with the Data Protection Directive (as nationally implemented), such laws are often not deployed in the manner intended by the lawmakers.
To achieve the aims of this Article, selectivity is key, if not essential. There are no doubt cases in which data protection laws are used by EU DPAs during Cloud Investigations in the ways envisaged by lawmakers, for example, to sanction a data breach. However, during my interviews, the respondents have elaborated mostly on the situations where data protection laws have been used in ways not envisaged by the lawmakers. Consequently, I focus in detail on such strategic uses of data protection laws during Cloud Investigations. Notwithstanding, this does not mean that data protection laws are not used in the ways intended by the legislative draftsperson during Cloud Investigations.
My data analysis suggests that both EU DPAs and Cloud Providers can often use data protection laws as bargaining chips during Cloud Investigations. This practice may have evolved out of the broad and discretionary powers of EU DPAs, which means that they can deploy many techniques, including negotiations, to achieve legal and regulatory compliance. Likewise, the time frame of Cloud Investigations-typically one to two years 150 -means that both parties develop a longstanding relationship that can often be distinct from other regulatory relationships, such as the relationship between the Cloud Provider and the judge in a lawsuit, where enforcement is often a once-and-only type decision.
My data analysis highlights four possible bargaining scenarios. In the first scenario, the EU DPA uses threats of fines, lawsuits, or similar enforcement actions under data protection laws to persuade the Cloud Provider to agree to its recommendations during Cloud Investigations.
151 This is the classic example of law's coercive power being invoked to bring about a change in the behavior of the regulatee. Depending on how the Cloud Provider responds, such threats can eventually turn into action as the "last resort" to generate the company's legal compliance.
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In the second scenario, the EU DPA seeks to persuade the Cloud Provider to change its processing operations and policies by suggesting that doing so would persuade the EU DPA to refrain from exercising its full legal powers concerning a detected data breach. 153 Several factors, such as the severity of the data breach and how the Cloud Provider responds to the regulator, may lead to this bargaining scenario. For example, if the EU DPA concludes that the Cloud Provider has not provided its users with clear and transparent information to explain why certain categories of "personal data" are being processed by the organization in its policies, the EU DPA may seek to cajole the Cloud Provider to amend the wording of its policies. It would do this by promising that it will not sanction the organization for this breach if the company makes the amendment within a given time frame, the alternative being for the EU DPA to impose a sanction straightaway. However, in reality this promise may not be worth as much as it might appear to, because many EU DPAs often attempt to investigate and resolve some of the data protection complaints filed by individuals during their Cloud Investigations. 154 In such cases, if the complainant is not satisfied with the outcomes of the Cloud Investigations (as they relate to his or her complaint), the EU DPA often has to formally investigate the complaint after the Cloud Investigation by using a separate procedure. 155 In effect, this means that although the Cloud Provider may have been persuaded to implement specific operational or policy changes during the Cloud Investigation on the basis that the EU DPA would not exercise its full legal powers, the provider can at times find itself in a situation in which this changes later. It is not clear to what extent both parties articulate this contingency during their negotiations. 156 In the third scenario, the EU DPA seeks to persuade the Cloud Provider to comply with measures that are not within the ambit of national data protection laws by offering extended benefits. Examples of extended benefits include an EU DPA publicly acknowledging that the Cloud Provider has fully cooperated with the regulator during the Cloud Investigation or an EU DPA positively phrasing the Cloud Provider's compliance with the law in public documents, such as the reports published at the end of the investigation. 157 Some EU DPAs may even publish reports that have been partly drafted by the investigated organization. 158 As one of the EU DPA respondents says: "If you [the Cloud Provider] want us [the EU DPA] to phrase it [your compliance] that way rather than another one, why should we care? . . . If we get the substance of what we want we don't care . . . how it is presented."
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In the final scenario, the Cloud Provider can often use legislative provisions to stall negotiations. For instance, in some Cloud Investigations, Cloud Providers argue that they do not fall within the "establishment" provision of the Data Protection Directive (as nationally implemented) and that the EU DPA has no jurisdiction over its activities. 160 often capitalize on some of the uncertainties that arise in the transnational context, in which it may not always be clear where the Cloud Provider is in fact "established" for the purposes of the Data Protection Directive. Under Article 4(1) of the Data Protection Directive, each EEA country has an obligation to apply the Data Protection Directive (as implemented nationally) if: (a) the processing is carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State; when the same controller is established on the territory of several Member States, he must take the necessary measures to ensure that each of these establishments complies with the obligations laid down by the national law applicable; (b) the controller is not established on the Member State's territory, but in a place where its national law applies by virtue of international public law; (c) the controller is not established on Community territory and for purposes of processing personal data makes use of equipment, automated or otherwise, situated on the territory of the said Member State, unless such equipment is used only for purposes of transit through the territory of the Community.
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As with other aspects of the Data Protection Directive, Article 4 suffers from several weaknesses. Article 4 is vague as it contains a number of unclear phrases, such as "in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller." 162 Article 4 has also been inconsistently implemented in the EEA. 163 In the cloud context, the concept of "establishment" can often be very problematic as it can often be difficult to determine where a "data controller" is "established" due to the complex cloud chain. 164 Occasionally, a Cloud Provider can question the legitimacy of the Cloud Investigation by arguing that the EU DPA does not have authority to regulate its activities because the company is not "established" in its jurisdiction within the meaning of the Data Protection Directive (as nationally implemented). 165 Legitimacy means that the EU DPA "is perceived as having a right to govern both by those it seeks to govern and those on behalf of whom it purports to govern." 166 The legitimacy argument also raises accountability questions, such as on whose behalf the EU DPAs are acting and whether the EU DPA has the right to call them to account. Here, the Cloud Providers use such arguments to either stall the negotiations or attempt to gain the upper hand during the negotiations. 167 161. Data Protection Directive, supra note 4, art. 4(1 In this Part, I evaluate how multiple calculations rather than only legal ones come together to generate regulatory effects, such as bringing the Cloud Providers' processing operations in line with the relevant laws. This analysis supports my contention that law can play variable roles during Cloud Investigations, depending on several factors, including the processing operations of the Cloud Providers, the aims and foci of the Cloud Investigations, the socio-political context, and so on. Sometimes law can be at the forefront of activity during Cloud Investigations while at other times law can retreat slightly from sight in the field of action as other actors carry out the act of "government." What are the centers of calculations commonly involved during Cloud Investigations? How do such centers of calculation enable "action at a distance" in the sense of enabling the EU DPA? I address these questions in this Part by examining some of the main calculations that can often be involved during some of the stages of Cloud Investigations.
A. The Three Stages of Cloud Investigations
Before delving into this matter, it would be useful if I explained my empirical findings on the three main stages of Cloud Investigations, namely, the pre-investigative, investigative, and post-investigative stages. 169 Generally speaking, the particular details of these three stages may vary depending on the aims and foci of the investigations, the applicable procedural laws, the national data protection laws, and so on.
Typically, the pre-investigative stage covers all the actions of the relevant parties that lead to the investigative stage. Depending on context, a number of matters can take place during the pre-investigative stage. For example, some EU DPAs can start to engage with the Cloud Provider through e-mail exchanges and conference calls to inform the company that the regulator may wish to formally investigate the organization in the forthcoming months.
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Other EU DPAs provide the Cloud Providers with detailed information about the subsequent investigative process and how they can get ready for the forthcoming investigation. 171 The investigative stage starts when the EU DPA formally initiates the Cloud Investigation by, for example, sending a letter of intention to investigate to the Cloud Provider, and ends when the report is finalized and/or published (not all reports are published). This stage has three main aspects, which can be iterative, namely, fact-finding, negotiations, and decision-making. Typically at the start of the investigative stage, the EU DPA gathers evidence about the Cloud Provider's compliance with data protection laws. The types of evidence collected vary depending on the context in question but can include internal and external data protection documents, algorithmic sequences performing a specific operation, such as data deletion, and so on.
Based on its review of such evidence and its discussion with the Cloud Provider, the EU DPA then decides about the provider's compliance in its processing operations and policies with the relevant laws. 173 Cloud Providers play an active role during the investigative stage by, for example, providing the EU DPAs with the relevant evidence, challenging how EU DPAs understand their operations, and clarifying their policies.
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Toward the end of the investigative stage, many EU DPAs usually reach preliminary decisions about the data protection compliance of the organization.
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Such decisions are either finalized or amended following negotiations with the Cloud Provider. 176 Typically, when negotiations take place during a Cloud Investigation, they can be quite lengthy, as both parties seek to reach mutually acceptable solutions. These are data protection solutions that bring the Cloud Provider's operations and policies in line with the relevant laws and do not damage the business interests of the company. Once the EU DPA has reached a final decision about the Cloud Provider's data protection compliance, the regulator details the findings of the Cloud Investigation in a lengthy report, with its recommendations and the timetable for the implementation of the recommendations. 177 Depending on the circumstances in question, the report can be either privately or publicly disseminated. 178 Finally, the post-investigative stage refers to the period following the dissemination (whether internal or external) of the investigation report.
179
Typically at this point, the EU DPA monitors whether the Cloud Provider is implementing its recommendations within the set time frame. 180 The Cloud Provider can also ask the EU DPA for further practical advice on how to implement certain recommendations or advice on future changes to its 172 So what accounts of compliance are produced during these different stages of Cloud Investigations? By whom? I answer these questions next by focusing on some of the typical accounts of compliance that are produced during the pre-investigative and investigative stages of Cloud Investigations. I do not analyze the accounts of compliance involved post-investigation, because many Cloud Investigations are in the early stages of postinvestigation. Consequently, I do not have enough data to evaluate comprehensively the "centers of calculation" involved during this phase.
B. Generating Compliance Accounts During Cloud Investigations
During the pre-investigative phase, multiple accounts of compliance can be generated by different actors depending on the investigation in question. For instance, an EU DPA that is unfamiliar with the data processing operations and business model of a Cloud Provider may engage in substantial discussions with various teams of the Cloud Provider, such as management, engineering, and legal, to know more about the entity it will regulate later. 182 Such discussions often generate several accounts of compliance; which involve various types of information, data protection policies, staff guidance on all aspects of data protection, and privacy permission screens. 183 Such discussions often generate several accounts of compliance, which involve various types of information, data protection policies, staff guidance on all aspects of data protection, and privacy permission screens. 184 Other "centers of calculations" can also be involved, including identifying the accounts of compliance that the company will need to provide to the regulator during the subsequent investigative stage, establishing the types of evidence that support these compliance accounts (such as data logs), and pinpointing the locations of such evidence. 185 This can often be tricky in cloud ecosystems. 186 Formal data protection laws can often underpin various calculations, such as evaluating the data protection compliance accounts that the organization needs to provide to the regulator by referring to the relevant legislative framework. However, and crucially for our purposes, the production of such accounts, which can often be vital to the regulator during the subsequent investigative stage, depends on other actors, who may or may not bring particular legal considerations with them when carrying out such tasks.
During the investigative stage, other accounts of compliance are generated, often by similar and at times new actors. For instance, depending on the aims and foci of the Cloud Investigation, the EU DPA may seek accounts of how specific technical functions, such as the encryption of messages, are performed to evaluate whether the Cloud Provider complies with its security and confidentiality obligations under the relevant national laws. 187 Here, multiple centers of calculation produce different accounts of how this specific security measure operates in practice. As an example, the legal team of the Cloud Provider generates an account of the organization's encryption policies as set out in its internal and external documents. The technical team of the Cloud Provider produces a different account of how encryption operates at a technical level. Such technical accounts may focus on key issues, including the encryption method, encryption key length, key access, the points at which data are encrypted, and whether the whole or part of the dataset is encrypted. Although data protection laws can often constitute some of the accounts, as with the pre-investigative phase, the production of these accounts does not depend solely on legal actors or factors.
Durable and mobile "inscriptions" become key here in enabling "action at a distance" because such inscriptions are later "acted upon" by other actors. For instance, if the data retention or deletion practices of the Cloud Provider are under scrutiny by the EU DPA, the technical team of the Cloud Provider often has to provide the regulator with detailed information of its storage options. 188 Typically, such information can be provided by a table or similar diagram that particularizes the stored data types, their formats, and their locations (for example, /data/data subdirectory or /mnt/sdcard). 189 This table is mobile since it can easily traverse different spaces, like the technical and legal team of the Cloud Provider, the sub-contractor of the EU DPAs, and so on, through instantaneous means, such as electronic mail, without being altered. These "inscriptions" play an important part in regulating "personal data" because they provide to the regulator reliable information on specific processing operations, such as the Cloud Provider's storage practices. If this information was not reliably transmitted to the regulator, the latter would be unable to assess whether, and to what extent, the Cloud Provider's storage policies comply with the relevant laws. These diverse compliance accounts are then reviewed or tested by many actors on the EU DPA end to evaluate to what extent the Cloud Provider adheres to data protection laws.
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Many EU DPAs can also collect other forms of evidence during the investigative stages by using various actors. The precise actors involved depend on a number of considerations, including how the EU DPA organizes its operations and the EU DPA's resources. Some EU DPAs with a limited number of staff may employ sub-contractors to test whether all the relevant algorithmic codes operate in the manner set out in the data or security policies of the Cloud Provider. 191 The sub-contractors provide a detailed account of each operation that has been technically tested, in a durable and mobile medium, such as a report, which is then later "acted upon" by the EU DPA.
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Other EU DPAs may ask specialist state agencies, such as the Financial Police, to inspect the premises and servers of the Cloud Provider. 193 Despite the divergence in terms of the actors involved during the fact-finding phase of an investigation, typically these actors review particular aspects of compliance, such as how the Cloud Provider handles personal information on a technical level, rather than conduct an overarching review of compliance, which happens later in the investigation.
As I mentioned earlier, although data protection laws underpin several aspects of these evaluations, such as determining which technical operations should be examined, the focus here can often be very much on examining key matters, for example, how cookie installation and deletion work in practice. Particular modes of inquiries, for instance real-time evaluation of how the staff of the Cloud Providers deals with security and data protection concerns, can often be used here to determine data protection compliance rather than merely reviewing a privacy policy. EU DPAs that use such types of inquiries tend to have either a higher or equal number of technically trained staff, as opposed to legally trained staff, to determine if the Cloud Provider is "accountable in reality" (my emphasis). 194 Having said that, the precise mix of legal and technical staff deployed in a Cloud Investigation depends on several factors, including the EU DPA's resources, the technical complexity of the investigation, and the stage of the investigation. Some EU DPAs use an equal mix of legal and technical staff. 195 Other EU DPAs may deploy more technical rather than legal staff during their Cloud Investigations. 196 For others still, the legal staff can often take a backseat role during the fact-finding phase of the investigations as the technical staff carries out most of the evaluation. Here, the legal staff tends to take on a more significant role during the decisionmaking and negotiation stages. 197 Consequently, for such EU DPAs during the early phases of Cloud Investigations, formal data protection laws may not always be visible in the field of action although they operate in the background.
For many EU DPAs, even when they have reached the later stages of the investigation and are forming overarching decisions about the Cloud Provider's legal compliance, they focus on whether the company is accountable in reality rather than whether the organization has only implemented data protection laws in its "fancy privacy policy."
198 As one of the EU DPA respondents says: We tend to be substance-oriented people . . . . We want to find out in reality are you implementing the law? So we certainly will read your privacy policy but that is not necessarily our focus . . . . We often hear the criticism that some EU DPAs are just focused on legal. We are not. We are focused on substance. So our approach is show me . . . . Show me what you are doing with the data. What's the security? Does this person have access to this data? Why? What do you mean you are providing access to this data to those people? So we will certainly be checking the legal basis but it's the legal basis for the substance. We will not spend hours agonizing over the finer points of your privacy policy. Your privacy policy is only your starting point. We are focusing on: is this company in reality accountable? Not, does it have a fancy privacy policy?
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The above extract is very significant as it illustrates that many EU DPAs focus on whether (and to what extent) the Cloud Provider can demonstrate legal compliance in reality.
These multiple accounts are examined by the EU DPA toward the end of the Cloud Investigation to determine the compliance of the Cloud Provider with the relevant data protection laws. 200 Here, there is evidently a very close link between the accounts produced during the Cloud Investigation and the outcomes of the Cloud Investigations. Outcomes include the compliance recommendations of the EU DPAs. This does not mean that accounts of compliance cannot be constructed in specific ways so that a particular version of compliance is generated, especially when the report produced at the end of the Cloud Investigation is published.
From the above, we can understand that data protection laws do not have privileged or static roles during Cloud Investigations. At times, law can be at the forefront of the activity during the Cloud Investigations, for instance, to determine the applicable norm. At other times, law works in conjunction with other elements, such as technological and social ones, to generate compliance accounts and, ultimately, regulation. For example, an inquiry into the data minimization procedures of the Cloud Provider is an account that focuses on legal, technological, and social matters such as the management's involvement in designing technologies or policies that protect personal data, the data minimization rule, and the technical personal data processing operations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have advanced two main arguments. First, during Cloud Investigations, EU DPAs and the Cloud Providers can use the legal framework to achieve multiple ends, some of which are not (explicitly at least) embodied 199. Id. 200. EU DPA Interviews, supra note 140. in the law itself. Second, I have argued that it should not be assumed that data protection laws dominate the investigative process at all times. Rather, such conclusions should be based on empirical evidence because at times law can disappear from view as other local actors participate in the regulatory process. In many Cloud Investigations the focus is not always on law as it appears in the relevant statute but rather on whether and to what extent the Cloud Provider is "accountable in reality." 201 Determining real accountability means relying on complex modes of inquiries, such as technical testing and real-time evaluation of the alignment between the Cloud Provider's processing operations and policies, which can shed light on how the organization operates in practice rather than in theory.
Going forward, three points should be borne in mind. Although it may be acceptable (although not desirable) for EU DPAs to rely on the truthfulness of the accounts provided by the Cloud Providers during an investigation, without requiring detailed supporting evidence, this practice is likely to become less acceptable when the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) applies in May 2018. In particular, the GDPR's explicit recognition of accountability, 202 enhanced rights for "data subjects," 203 and stricter obligations for both "controllers" and "processors" 204 mean that Cloud Providers will inevitably have to provide their regulators with more detailed and reliable evidence of their legal compliance. As an example, nowadays, even in cases where the EU DPA reviews portions of the algorithms to determine whether the processing operations of the Cloud Provider complies with the law, the EU DPA has to trust that the company has provided the regulator with the algorithmic sequence that is actually implemented. Consequently, one of the tasks ahead is to evaluate how EU DPAs can obtain suitable and adequate accounts of compliance during investigations. Related, a second task ahead is for EU DPAs to provide guidance to investigated companies on the appropriate measures, tools, and practices that they should adopt in order to comply with and demonstrate their compliance with data protection laws to relevant stakeholders, such as the EU DPAs and the data subjects. DPAs should act in concert with one another when producing such guidance in order to promote a transnational approach to compliance as well as reduce legal uncertainty, legal inconsistency, and compliance costs. Finally, if Cloud Investigations are to achieve their regulatory aims, it is important that EU DPAs investigate cloud-centric issues during their Cloud Investigations rather than only general data protection issues. Currently, data protection issues specific to the cloud, such as data deletion in highly fragmented ecosystems, are not adequately scrutinized during Cloud Investigations.
In all likelihood, as cloud computing is adopted more widely in Europe, it is inevitable that more cloud-based companies will come under the scrutiny of European regulators. By ignoring cloud-centric issues during Cloud Investigations, EU DPAs are at severe risk of ignoring key data protection concerns raised by particular cloud ecosystems and obtaining only partial views of compliance during the investigative process. This also has serious implications for the trust of the public in the efficacy of the investigative process in obtaining a full account of the compliance of the Cloud Provider with the relevant data protection laws.
